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Abstract 
 
Rapidly aging population in high-income countries has exerted additional pressure on 
the sustainability of public pension expenditure. We present a formal model of public 
pension expenditure under endogenous human capital, where the latter facilitates a 
substantial decrease in equilibrium fertility rate alongside the improvement in life 
expectancy. We demonstrate how higher life expectancy and human capital endowment 
facilitate the rise of net replacement rate. We provide and examine an empirical model 
of old-age expenditure in a panel of 33 countries in the period 1998–2008. Our results 
indicate that increases in total fertility rate and effective retirement age would reduce 
age-related expenditure substantially. While higher net replacement rate would alleviate 
the risk of old-age poverty, it would endanger long-term sustainability of public finance 
by imposing additional pressure on deficit and public debt. 
 
JEL classification: H55, J11, C54. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The 2010 edition of World Population Prospects (Population Division 2010) suggests 
that in the next few decades world regions are set to experience a brisk growth of the 
share of elderly population in the light of declining fertility rates. Between 2010 and 
2050, the share of population aged 65 and older is expected to increase by 6.4 percent in 
Sweden, 8.1 percent in the United States, 10.5 percent in Germany and 12.3 percent in 
Italy. Rapidly aging population is no panacea to the developing world either. Until 
2050, the share of elderly population in China and India is expected to increase by 
three-fold. 
 While the growth of life expectancy in advanced countries led to the downward 
convergence of the fertility rates, it has also exerted a persistent and significant strain on 
public pension systems. The vast majority of advanced countries adopted pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) social security schemes that were left intact ever since the widespread adoption 
after Bismarckian revolution in 19th century Germany. 
 The actuarial rationale for PAYG schemes rested mainly on the assumption of 
fertility rates above replacement levels, stationary population growth and low share of 
elderly population. Early contributions of Samuelson (1958), and Cass and Yaari (1966) 
derived the equivalence of population growth rate and market rate of interest as the 
necessary conditions for the solvency of PAYG schemes. While favourable stationary 
demographic characteristics constituted a necessary condition for PAYG schemes, high 
effective retirement age is a sufficient condition for the relative solvency of PAYG 
schemes. 
 From 1970s onwards, European social democracies experienced a sudden decline in 
effective retirement age, partly because of the widespread adoption of policies favouring 
early retirement. The decrease in the retirement age, well-discussed in the 
microeconomic literature (cf. Jappelli and Modigliani 1998; Quinn et al. 1998; 
Canegrati 2007), reflected the increase in life expectancy at age 65 as well as the brisk 
improvement of medical care embodied in the decline of overall mortality rates or, as 
Gendell (1998, p. 25) contends, “by the early 1990s, in all four countries [Germany, 
Japan, Sweden and the U.S.], according to life-tables, no less than 75 percent and as 
many as 91 percent of the births survived to age 65”. 
 The increase in life expectancy at various age cohorts combined with decreasing 
effective retirement age and persistent increase in the share of elderly population 
questioned the fiscal solvency of public pension schemes since excessive increase in 
retirement benefits through defined-benefit schemes led to disequilibrium outcomes. 
The widespread increase in various types of benefits in the 20th and 21st century 
developed world created numerous adverse consequences. The decrease in effective 
retirement age resulted in continuous increases in overall and marginal tax rates while 
the net replacement ratio was already high in high-income OECD countries since, 
according to Gruber and Wise (1998, p. 8), “small deviations from actuarial fairness in 
the intertemporal pattern of benefits accrual can imply very large tax rates if 
replacement rates are very high.” 
 The disequilibrium outcomes, purported by large and generous net replacement 
rates, caused some distorting inefficiencies, particularly in the labour market. Given a 
strong response of the long-run labour supply to changes in tax rates (Prescott 2004), 
higher marginal tax rates and implicit tax rates on work at later ages led to the natural 
downward adjustment of labour supply by persistent decreases in working hours and 
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labour market participation rates. The incidence of early retirement further extended the 
unused labour capacity, particularly in the 55–64 age cohort since high marginal tax 
rates on work in later ages induced the early withdrawal from the labour market. 
Therefore, the unused labour capacities were resulted partly due to the indirect influence 
of high tax burden and partly because of the intensity of labour market regulation, 
particularly concerning working incentives at later ages. The intensity of the labour 
market regulation, measured by barriers to work and the prevalence of early retirement 
incentives, therefore encouraged the decision to retire before the statutory age. 
 The combination of changing demographic landscape and widespread adoption of 
early retirement mechanisms raised concerns over the fiscal solvency of publicly funded 
PAYG pension systems. Fiscal implications of aging for the sustainability of public 
pension systems were further amplified by the fact that the ratio of public pension 
expenditure to GDP has been rising over time. Although the negative consequences of 
adverse shocks, such as aging population, for the fiscal imbalance have been vastly 
discussed, the literature lacks the appropriate empirical framework to establish an 
analytical narrative for the assessment of the fiscal solvency of public pension systems. 
On the other hand, the measure of fiscal solvency would be difficult to define without a 
comprehensive theoretical framework, able to capture the fullest possible influence of 
the underlying demographic parameters on the fiscal sustainability of expenditure on 
public pensions in the long-term. In fact, the irreversibility of public pension 
expenditure under high replacement rates is the missing piece of public economics 
literature as it sets the major challenge to predict the trends of age-related spending as 
well as the resulting impact on macroeconomic stability. 
 The purpose of this article is thus two-fold; on one hand to provide a sound 
theoretical framework for studying the effects of changing demographic and economic 
conditions on the size of public pension expenditure, and on the other to perform a 
robust empirical analysis of the relationship between public pension expenditure and its 
key economic and demographic determinants for the period 1998–2008 on a panel of 33 
countries representing various constitutional and institutional settings. 
 From the theoretical perspective, we attempt to determine how public pension 
expenditure is determined by demographic and macroeconomic determinants. Our 
research questions relate old-age expenditure and aging population under endogenous 
human capital, where the latter facilitates the rise in net replacement rate alongside a 
substantial decrease in fertility rate in demographic transition. The model demonstrates 
the rise in life expectancy at various ages as the cause of higher net replacement rates 
upon withdrawal from the labour market and, consequently, higher old-age expenditure 
in the share of GDP. 
 From the empirical perspective, we examine direction and strength of the 
relationship between public pension expenditure and a sequence of demographic and 
macroeconomic determinants. In particular, we focus on the effect of old-age 
dependency ratio, effective retirement age, fertility rate, gross savings, net replacement 
rate, and life expectancy on public pension expenditure. We shall also attempt to 
account for the differences in the effect of institutional features of public pension 
systems on the level of public pension expenditure, considering integrally Continental 
European, Anglo-Saxon, Nordic and Mediterranean countries. 
 The article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present a brief overview of the 
literature, emphasizing the theoretical framework of public pensions and the relevant 
cross-country evidence on the evaluation of the costs and fiscal implications of aging. In 
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Section 3, we provide a theoretical framework, building on establishing rigorous 
neoclassical assumptions of our model and deriving the equilibrium conditions for the 
hypothesis stated. In Section 4, we outline the data sources exploited in this article. In 
Section 5, we briefly present the methodology and then focus on empirical evidence and 
the interpretation of results. Section 6 concludes with the main findings and some policy 
implications. 
 
 
2. Review of the literature 
 
Under PAYG pension schemes, mandatory contribution rates are determined by net 
replacement rate, defined as the ratio of old-age pension relative to net earnings prior to 
the retirement, and the old-age dependency ratio. Early contributions to the theoretical 
solution to the PAYG schemes by Samuelson (1958), and Cass and Yaari (1966) 
assumed a stationary population in the framework of an overlapping-generations general 
equilibrium (OLG-GE) model. In this framework, the generational equivalence required 
to maintain constant consumption streams to retired generations is assumed as the 
equality of population growth rate and the market interest rate, which broadly reflects 
the internal rate of return from PAYG schemes or, according to Samuelson (1958, p. 
476), “every geometrically growing consumption-loan economy has an equilibrium rate 
of interest exactly equal to its biological percentage growth rate.” 
 The equivalence condition required to maintain the sustainability of PAYG pension 
schemes implies either a stationary growth of the population or low old-age dependency 
ratio. Samuelson’s generational equivalence condition easily prevailed in a typical 
Malthusian population characterized by high fertility rates amid the demographic 
transition. However, as the demographic dividend came to end and as the decline of 
employment-population ratio paced quickly, lower equilibrium rates of population 
growth were not accompanied by the downward adjustment of the real rate of return 
from PAYG pension schemes. The inequality of the generational equivalence unfolded 
the unsustainability of PAYG schemes in the long run, primarily driven by fiscal 
insolvency of a growing stock of unfunded pension liabilities. 
 Feldstein and Liebman (2001) assessed theoretical and empirical implications of the 
transition from current PAYG schemes into fully funded pension schemes based on 
investment-based individual savings accounts. While the introduction of PAYG 
schemes benefitted older age cohorts, it imposed a considerable strain on younger 
generations facing a small internal rate of return on mandatory contributions into PAYG 
public schemes. In addition, PAYG schemes impose significant deadweight loss, 
captured by the elasticity of taxable labour income with respect to marginal tax rates, by 
distorting labour supply decisions and lowering national savings rate.  
 The consequences of subsequent ignorance of distributional effects of PAYG 
schemes were emphasized by Barr and Diamond (2009), Bovenberg and Knapp (2005), 
and Dutta et al. (2000). The equilibrium implications of the intergenerational 
redistribution within various birth cohorts suggest the finding, later reinforced by 
Feldstein (2001), that leaving benefit rules within PAYG financing scheme would 
increase the tax rate required to finance the benefits by 50 percent or more. 
 Whilst acknowledging the impact of aging population and changing demographic 
parameters, the vast majority of the literature identified early retirement policies as the 
major cause of the budgetary imbalances concerning fiscal implications of aging. 
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Boskin (1975), utilizing the data from U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics, studied 
the cohort of white married males in their sixties to estimate the model of early 
retirement behaviour. The findings identify income guarantee and implicit tax rate on 
work at later ages as the main causes of early retirement while the results suggest that a 
decrease in implicit tax rate would substantially reduce the probability of early 
retirement.  
 Herbertsson and Orszag (2001) provided the theoretical framework to assess to cost 
of early retirement. Contrary to Gruber and Wise (1998), the study did not incorporate 
unused labour capacity as the percentage of older workers out of the labour force but the 
share of potential GDP lost due to incidence of early retirement in a panel of OECD 
countries between 1980 and 1998. The study suggests that the loss of potential GDP 
varies in relation to labour market regulation and the extent to which it affects early 
retirement behaviour. The loss, estimated at 5–7 percent of annual potential GDP, is 
characterized as the cost of early retirement at the macro level. It is considerably higher 
in EU countries of the OECD panel, reflecting more stringent labour market regulation 
and the significance of early retirement. 
 In a quest to attain the causes and implications of early retirement, Blöndal and 
Scarpetta (1999) studied the incidence of early retirement in a cross-section of OECD 
countries since 1960s. The early withdrawal from the labour market, caused by 
increased affluence and higher real per capita incomes, has resulted in higher demand 
for leisure, particularly at older ages. The background of the incidence of early 
retirement in the labour market, such as competitive disadvantage of older workers, has 
been emphasized as the major cause of early exit from the labour force. In addition to 
labour market background, the continuous expansion of occupation pension schemes 
and increased non-employment benefits and old-age pensions embodied in social 
security systems accelerated the incidence of early retirement. The majority of high-
income OECD countries have steadily enjoyed high net replacement rates where old-
age pension almost matched pre-retirement income. The disincentives for older workers 
imparted by the regulation of labour markets have exerted a strong effect on early 
retirement decision, as cross-country differences in effective retirement age are closely 
related to the extent of the disincentives to work at older ages. 
 Baker et al. (2003) studied the effects of systemic incentives in Canadian Income 
Security System (CIS) on early retirement. Overall, their findings suggest stronger 
responses to Income Security system in Canada compared to the U.S. In earlier studies, 
Coile and Gruber (2007) established the significance of future entitlements on 
retirement decision while Coile and Gruber (2004) simulated the effect of several policy 
changes, such as raising early entitlement age and full-benefit age, and showed that 
these could affect retirement decision substantially. 
 The incidence of early retirement in transition countries had been documented by 
Svejnar (1996), Verbič (2007), and Polanec et al. (2010). In early 1990s, transition 
countries experienced the crisis of PAYG pension systems. Demographic stratification 
of transition countries departed from the homogeneity of the demographic structure 
since high-income transition countries (Slovenia, Czech Republic) resembled the OECD 
average more than lower-income countries in Eastern Europe.1 The period of transition 
                                                 
1 Given the enormous variation in pensions-to-GDP ratio in transition countries, the average pension tax 
wedge across transition countries represented 25.5 percent compared to 16.6 percent in the OECD. The 
highest pension tax wedge in the early stage of transition was found in Hungary (35 percent), Slovenia 
(31 percent), and Poland (30 percent). 
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in Central and Eastern Europe was characterized by deteriorating labour market 
conditions (Blanchflower and Freeman 1994), which further resulted in high net 
replacement rates and low effective retirement age. The existence of PAYG pension 
schemes in transition countries in early 1990s imposed high tax burden on earnings. The 
sudden incidence of early retirement set the stage for intergenerational distribution, 
lowering net replacement rates for prospective generations amid growing old-age 
dependency ratios, although the introduction of stringent eligibility criteria in Czech 
Republic and notional defined contributions in Poland and Hungary leaned towards 
mitigating adverse shocks of aging population on public pension expenditure. 
 The accuracy of estimating public pension expenditure in the future depends 
crucially on demographic and macroeconomic assumptions. Recent forecasts of pension 
spending as a share of GDP (European Commission 2006) suggest that until 2050 
European countries would experience higher share of spending on public pensions in 
GDP under constant fertility rates, increased longevity and gradually increasing old-age 
dependency ratio. As Dang et al. (2001, p. 18) contend, “Pension spending is projected 
to fall as a share of the GDP in Poland, where shifts are taking place towards private 
pension arrangements, as well as for the United Kingdom, and to remain broadly stable 
for Italy, partly reflecting recent reforms. In contrast, increases of more than 4 
percentage points of GDP are projected for ten countries, and for seven among these it 
will be 5 percentage points or more.” In addition, estimates by Disney (1999) suggest 
that, by 2030, European countries would have to raise tax-to-GDP ratio significantly to 
keep net debt constant under unchanged PAYG financing scheme. 
 Of the most adverse consequences of PAYG pension schemes under prospective 
demographic parameters is the implicit pension debt, broadly defined as the present 
value of prospective entitlement under current fiscal policy regime (Kotlikoff and 
Leibfritz 1999). Van den Noord and Herd (1993) estimated the present value of net 
pension liabilities in OECD countries, defined as the present value of future income 
based on constant contribution rates. The findings suggest that in early 1990s, net 
pension liabilities in OECD countries were considerably lower in the U.S. (43 percent 
of GDP), compared to Japan (200 percent of GDP), Italy (233 percent of GDP) and 
France (286 percent of GDP). Unfunded fiscal obligations for European countries were 
studied by Gokhale (2009), suggesting that fiscal imbalance of social security in terms 
of present value is excessively higher compared to the size of GDP. Implicit debt of 
PAYG pension schemes was the subject of intensive debate in Latin America following 
the introduction of individual savings accounts in Chile in 1981. Bravo and Uithoff 
(1999) presented the quantitative assessment of implicit pension debt in Latin America 
in 1990, suggesting significant transitional fiscal costs in shifting from unfunded PAYG 
schemes to individual savings accounts.2 
 
 
3. Expenditure on public pensions: Theory and hypotheses 
 
The aim of this section is to provide a theoretical framework to study the effects of 
changing demographic and macroeconomic parameters on the size of public pension 
                                                 
2 Exploiting the differences in the implicit debt of PAYG pension systems in Latin America, the 
enormous variation in the size of the implicit debt, ranging from 305.4 percent of GDP in Argentina to 19 
percent of GDP in Ecuador, the study emphasized the concurrent change in benefit and eligibility criteria 
in shifting towards contribution-defined pension schemes. 
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expenditure. Earlier attempts to provide a coherent theoretical framework include 
Samuelson (1958), Cass and Yaari (1966), Diamond (1965), Blanchard (1985), and 
Gertler (1999). In order to analyze long-run impact of fiscal policy and social security, 
we believe that the missing gap of the literature is to incorporate demographic effects, 
notably fertility rate and old-age dependency ratio, in the relationship explaining the 
long-run pressure of ageing and replacement rates on public pensions, defined as the 
ratio of pension expenditure to GDP. 
 First, we state some crucial motivating assumptions of our model. Consider a set of 
economies i, i = 1, ..., I, with a horizon in discrete time t, t = 1, ..., T. As the 
representative agents in countries 1, ..., I discount the future by discount factor βi, the 
net lifetime benefit of the representative agent, NBit, can be written as (cf. Acemoglu 
2005): 
 
 , (1) (
1
T
it i it it
t
NB y eβ
=
= −∑ )
 
where ty  represents representative agent’s lifetime earnings and  represents agent’s 
lifetime expenditure. Each representative agent has access to the following Cobb-
Douglas technology to produce the final good qit in the economy: 
te
 
 11
1
i
it it it
i
q A Z iα αα
−= − , (2) 
 
where Zit denotes investment in country i at time t, while At represents the level of 
public goods in country i at time t, such as the quality of infrastructure, and αi is the 
appropriate (partial) elasticity. 
 The baseline level of public pension expenditure is derived from public investment 
in the Cobb-Douglas technology setup, and is financed by a continuum of taxes. The tax 
rate itτ  is assumed to be determined exogenously, { }0,1itτ ∈ . Hence, tax revenues Τ  at 
time t in country i are given by: 
 
 it it ityτΤ = . (3) 
At tax rate 
 
 itτ , the agent’s lifetime consumption can be written as: 
 
( )( )1 1it it it itc sτ≤ − − q , (4) 
here  represents the representative agent’s savings rate at time t in country i. The 
ol
 
 
w  its
ruling p itical elite at time t decides on how much to spend on the level of public goods 
at time t + 1: 
 
( ) 1
1
1 i ii i
it it
i
A G
δ θα δ
α
−
+
−⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, (5) 
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where  denotes the share of government spending on the level of public good in itG
 i. country Parameter iδ  captures the extent of returns to scale, where decreasing returns 
to scale are assumed 1i; δ > . In addition, iθ  represents the distribution parameter of 
power to pressure the political elite to increase the share of government spending; an 
increasing iθ  implies greater pressure on the government to raise government spending 
on particular public good at time t + 1, 1itA + . 
 The first-best allocation mechanism 
choice of lifetime earnings and expenditure
(Acemoglu 2005) could be described by the 
 as to maximize the total surplus of the 
economy, NYi: 
 
( ) ( )( )1 10 11 1 1i i
T
i
i i it it it it it it
t i i i
NY y A Z Z Aα δα αβ τ α α δ
− −
+
=
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= − − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟− − −⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∑ i
θ
θ . (6) 
 Assume that the continuum of agents (citizens), consists of old and young agents. 
he elderly retire effectively at age , while the young have no prior information about 
 
T i
the anticipated effective retirement age. 
 The elderly will pressure the governing political elite through i
a
θ  to increase the 
share of Gi from time t to j. Hence, the elderly will maximize the utility of the lifetime 
consumption as discounted net present value of itA , ( )itW A . The characterization of the 
lifetime consumption of the elderly can be written by a Bellman (1957) equation: 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )max i iiit j it j it j i it jW A A W Aδ θα β++ + + +
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪= Τ − +⎨ ⎬ . 1it jA i i iα δ θ+ − −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
(7) 
Since
 
  1iδ >
ble and
, the initial payoff to the political elite is bounded,
ifferentia  concave, and the value of W is continuously differentiable as well. 
 continuously 
d
The first-order condition for choosing it jA +  is thus: 
 
 ('
1
i
it iA W A )1i ij it
i
δ θα βα−
−
+ += . (8) 
Next, we shall incorporate into our model fert
expectancy, and old-age dependence. At last, we shall combine the studied demographic 
ffects as determinants of public pension expenditure. 
e assume old-age dependency ratio to be derived from the state of demographic 
ectancy and fertility. Since fertility rates differ across 
ountries and income levels, the dynamic of the population growth follows an inverted 
 
 ility rate, human capital, life 
e
 
 
Fertility and human capital 
 
W
variables, such as life exp
c
U-shape of the fertility-income relationship or, as Lucas (2002, p. 161) contends: “As 
income increases from its Malthusian steady state level, population first increases, then 
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decreases, [where] the role played by demography in this model is entirely passive.” 
Hence, fertility rates across different levels of per capita income crucially depend on the 
level of endogenous human capital. 
 Under typical Cobb-Douglas constant-return technology, a purely exogenous 
treatment of human capital would thereby facilitate technological improvement by 
increasing the fertility rate alongside the equilibrium path of balanced growth. In the 
psim lest possible form (cf. Lucas 2002), we consider the following utility preference 
function: 
 
 ( ) 1, ,i i i i i iW c n w c n wβ φ β−= , (9) 
 
where ci, ni and wi represent household consumption, number of children and the 
action of time devoted to goods production in countrfr y i, respectively. In addition, iφ  
represents fertility allocation parameter, which is assumed to be normally distributed in 
a cross-country distribution. Letting ith  denote human capital, production per household 
can be arranged into it ith w . The remaining time is considered to be devoted to child 
raising. Child-raising activity would involve an amount ki of time per child. Hence, 
parents would spend an amount 1 i ik n−  of time producing goods. The budget constraint 
of the representative household can be written as: 
 
 )i ic h (1i ik h≤ − . (10) 
 
In the Lucas-type model, human capital of the househo 
so
ld grows at a constant rate, 
 that 1it i ith hρ+ = , where iρ  represents the growth rate 
e basic setup, the household solves the following
of human capital in country i. In 
th  Bellman equation: 
 
 ( ) ( )
,
max , , ( )
i i
i i i i ic n
f h W c n v hρ= , (11) 
 
here ( )  is the value function describing the best possible value of the objective i iv hρ
nction
w
a 1) of the form ( )i i is a fu  of the state . The solution for equation (11ith + f h D h= , 
will be given where the constant Di satisfies: 
 
 ( )max (1 ), ,
i
i i i i i i i i in
D h W h k n n D hρ= − . (12) 
 
 Considering the first-order conditions to solve (9) for ni, denoting the number of 
hildren, would be given by (cf. Lucas 2002, p. 155): c
 
 
1i i i i
ik n φβ φ= − +
 
. (13) 
he solution implies that technological change, captured by the exogenous growth rate T
iρ , would not alter fertility dynamics at all, suggesting that  is increasingly related 
to the rate of technological change. 
i iD h
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 echnological change, 
th i
As simultaneous human capital decisions set the course for t
e growth of human capital is endogenized when ρ  is replaced by: 
 
 ( )1it it ith h λ υ+ = , (14) 
where it
 
υ  denotes the fraction of time endowment devoted to raising one child in the 
household, whereas λi represents the growth rate of human capital. The fraction of time 
devoted to child-raising, itυ , is assumed to increas alongside the ince rease in the stock 
f hum n capital, whic rther implies an immediate reduction in the equilibrium 
umber of childre
o a h fu
n. In addition, n itυ  enters the 
inimum amount ki of time, the resource constraint of the representative household is: 
equation (14) exogenously. With a 
m
 
 ( )1 ( )i i i i ic h k nυ≤ − + . (15) 
 
 The household's Bellm n equation would then take the form: 
 
 ( ) ( )
a
( )( )
, ,
m , ,
i i i
i i i i ic n
f h W c n g hυ λ υ= , (16) ax
 
( )i i iD h f h= , Di must ssubject to (15). Again, letting atisfy: 
 
 ( )( )
,
max 1 ( ) , ,
i i
i i i i i in
W k n n Dυ υ λ υ− + . (17) 
Considering the two-first order condition for W with 
(10), the total time expenditure for child raising would be: 
 
 respect to ni and wi, and 
reverting to 
 
 1( )
1 ( )
i i
i i
i i i i
k
n k n
φ βυ υ
−= + − +
earranging (18) would yield the following expression: 
. (18) 
 
R
 
 ( )
1
i
i i ik n
i i
ηυ β η+ = − + . (19) 
 
Compared to exogenous technological change in (1
that fertility rate and human capital investment remain separately unaffected. Given the 
 would become: 
 
 3), the solution in (19) implies 
parametric solution, the first-order condition to solve (18)
 
'( )
( ) 1
i i
i i
i i
λ nυ φβ λ iυ β φ= − + , (20) 
 
here, following the Becker et al. (1990) setting, we assume that dynamic human 
capital growth takes the exponential form: 
 
w
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 ( ) ii i iϑλ υ ς υ= , (21) 
 
here iςw  represents baseline fertility rate, whereas iϑ  embodies the human capital 
growth parameter. 
For human capital growth, rearranging (20) yields:  
 
1
1 ( )
i
i i i in k ni i i
ββϑ υ υ
−= − + . (22)  
 
H nd ience, to solve for the equilibrium values for ni a υ  in separate forms, we use (19) 
and (22) to yield: 
 
 1 i i iη βϑ−in = 1i i ik ; (23) η β+ −
 
 i ii
i i i
βϑυ η βϑ= − . (24) 
The solution of (23) denotes the number of children. In our empirical framework, 
t
 
 
iwe modify the parameter to express total fertility ra e. As ς  from expression (21) 
epresents the bar seline fertility rate, we henceforth denote i/i in Fς =  as the total 
e number of children born to a woman over her 
fetime, the number of women denoted by Fi. 
 As fertility rates and human capital decision are derived simultaneously in the 
xponential example, any particular changes in the baseline parameter 
fertility rate, defined as the averag
li
iςe  leave 
ehavioural response to the stock of human capitab l unaltered. An increase in iϑ  leads to 
 endowed with human capital investment, and a corresponding greater amount of time iυ
reduction in equilibrium fertility rate. 
 
 
Life expectancy and old-age dependence 
 
The fraction of the elderly in country i at time t, / , is a function of life Oi iN N
expectancy at birth, ( )itlΓ : 
 
 ( )O it
it
N l
N
⎛ ⎞ = Γ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , (25) 
 
here N  and N  represent the w i
ivel
Oi
 assum
total population and the elderly population, 
spect y. We e , i.e. the elasticity of old-age population with respect 
greater than zero, so that life expectancy 
provements facilitate increases in old-age population. 
 ( )' 0itlΓ >re
to changes in life expectancy to be 
im
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 The utility of the elderly upon the effective retirement age i, Oitu , can be subsumed 
in the utility function e r
a
 of th epresentative household (cf. Lucas 2002): 
, (26) 
 
1
i
i i
i
L
a
Oit
a
u e π−
=
=∑ 
 
w { }1, 2,...,∈here  represents the discount factor populated through the years, iπ i ia L , 
i.e. until the repres ative individual’s life expectancy Li. The discount factor is derived 
from the representative agen e utility function. 
 We assume that the individuals in country i and time t live until life expectancy at 
age 65. The latter is determined for a representative ag
ent
t’s lifetim
ent by external effects to the 
i , (27) 
 and  capture negative and positive externalities to life expectancy during 
se of i 3 ed as the ratio
agent’s length of life. The expression can be written as:  
 
T ( )( )65
1
1 1i it ni p
t
l l d d
=
= − +∑ 
 
nid
r
pidwhere 
the cou ndividual’s lifetime.  The net replacement ratio is defin  
between real pension earnings and pre-retirement earnings in time { }1,..., 'T .it∈ e 
ratio is defined as: 
 Th
 
 ( )'
1
1
iT
i
i t it
ti
r y
y
ω τ
=
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ , (28) 
 
where iy  represents agent’s earnings, which are then adjusted for effective tax rate iτ , 
while  represents real retirement income. In addition,  represents the age of 
ithdr l from the labour market, as pre-retirement incom  is earned until effective 
Th
ir
awa
ent
'iT
ew
retirem  age. e distribution parameter iω  captures the share of agent’s earnings in 
fixed pension income from 'iT  onwards. By definition, 1iω ≤  and the share of 
retirement income is thus not assumed to be unique across the stratum of the eld y. 
 Suppose that th
erl
e elderly population is characterized by high and low endowment of 
uman capital. Let represent the stock of human capital accumulated over time t in 
ountry i an capital return 
dividuals in cou i, i.e. the one with high and t
uman capital, denoted 
itK
. The difference in hum
ntry 
h
c between the two representative 
in he one with low endowment of 
, can be written as discounted over T periods of time: h iψ
 
 
1 11 1
T T
Hit Lit
i Hi Li
t tBi Bi
B BK K
g g
ψ
= =
= − = −+ +∑ ∑
 
, (29) 
                                                 
3 See Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) for a thorough and rigorous theoretical discussion of the overall 
effect of life expectancy on economic growth by including baseline differences across countries. 
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where BHit and BLit represent th  benefits of human capital ac lation over the life 
cycle of the representative individual with high and low endowment of human capital, 
e cumu
respectively, whereas Big  represents the appropriate discount rate. Hence, adjusting net 
replacement rate for differences in human capital return yields the aggregate net 
replacement rate: 
 
 ( )
1
' 1
1
i i
T
i
i it it
r y
1tiy
ψω τ −
=
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
(30) 
here
∑ , 
 
w  1iψ ≤ , so that there exist increasing returns to ed
ension expenditure, we assume a non-stationary pay-as-you-go pension scheme. 
ucation. Considering the 
p
 The budget constraint of the net replacement ratio /i ir y  is, as an instantaneous 
relationship, determined by the old-age dependency ratio. We derive the constraint as: 
 
 
1
T
i Ai
i
r N
ti Oiy N=
where 
μ=∑ , (31) 
 
iμ  denotes the baseline discount rate defined in time t over T number of periods, 
hereas AiN  represents the working-age population. 
Among the demographic determinants, we assume that the level of expenditure 
sponds negatively to the increase in total fertilit
w
 
 
Public pension expenditure 
 
Based on the above findings, the level of public pension expenditure in country i at time 
t, Git, is jointly determined by a sequence of demographic and macroeconomic 
determinants. 
 
re y rate itς , as the old-age dependency 
ratio would decline proportionately to the positive shocks in fertility rate. On the other 
and, the response of the expenditure level to the fraction  the elderly ( ), and 
as
In the set of macroeconomic determinants, we assume a positive response of the 
xpenditure level to increases in net replacement ratio , while the response to 
GDP ratio  is assume as higher aggregate 
of /Oit itN Nh
to incre es in life expectancy at various ages (at birth, 0itl , and at age 65, 65itl ), is 
positive. 
 
/it itr y
d negative 
e
itsincreases in the savings-to-
savings decrease the pressure on the baseline budget constraint. Nevertheless, we 
anticipate a reduction in the level of public pension expenditure in response to increase 
in effective retirement age ait. 
 Hence, by extending the existing theoretical framework by the set of demographic 
and macroeconomic determinants we obtain the following expression: 
 
 01 2 3 4 0 5 65 6 7 8 ,it it it it it it
it it
N rG a l l s v
N y
γ γ γ γ γ γ ς γ γ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= + + + + − − + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  (32) it
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where ,j 1,...,8j  are the parameters of the model  to be estimated by an appropriate 
4γ =
econometric technique, and (0, )itv IID Σ∼  is the disturbance term. 
 
 
4. Data sources 
 
To analyze the relationship between public pension spending and demographic and 
macroeconomic indicators, we utilize the data available from national statistics and 
prehensive panel 
at would allow an evaluation of within- and between-country variation effects of 
geing, fertility, effective retirement age and savings-to-GDP ratio. 
Once the variation in demographic and macroeconomic variables is explo
stimated coefficients would allow a cross-country comparison of the direct effect of 
rable attent
raphic determ
Our panel consists of 33 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, 
zech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
various other sources of data, as described below. Although we are aware of the 
potential measurement error and biases, we aimed at building a com
th
a
 ited, the 
e
ageing and fertility on the future size of public pension spending, which should be given 
conside ion given the lack of literature on the relationship between public 
pension spending and demog inants. 
 
C
Iceland, Ireland, 
ealand, NorwayZ
United Kingdom, and United States.5 Time period 1998–2008 is used for the analysis, 
which gives us 363 observations in total (a strongly balanced panel). 
 We avoided the aggregation bias of country size by defining public pension 
expenditure as a share of country’s GDP. The data on public pension expenditure in the 
share of GDP for Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Norway, Switzerland, and the U.S. were reported in Social Expenditure Database 
(OECD 2011b), while the relevant data for EU countries were reported by Eurostat’s 
Pension Expenditure Database (Eurostat 2011). 
 We attempted to capture the effect of old-age dependency ratio on the size of public 
pension expenditure, as dependency ratio incorporates the effect on old-age pension 
more efficiently than the share of population aged 65 years and above (65+), given a 
significant between-country variation in effective retirement age.6 The data on old-age 
dependency ratio for OECD member states were reported in Pensions at a Glance 
(OECD 2011a) while the data for Cyprus, Estonia, Malta and Slovenia for the period 
1998–2008 were obtained from Eurostat. 
 Although the increase in retirement age to prevent early retirement has been an 
essential measure to ensure the sustainability of age-related public expenditure, there is 
tlelit  evidence on the link between retirement age and age-related expenditure (cf. Filer 
                                                 
4 The sign of any given coefficient , 1,...,8j jγ =  in expression (32) represents the expect direction of 
effect of that determinant on public pe iture (to be examined hereinafter). 
5 We thus have in our sample 30 hi ECD economies, Mexico that – according to World 
Bank’s Country Group Classification – is classified as an upper-middle income cou
nsion expend
gh-income O
ntry, and two non-
OECD countries (Cyprus and Malta). 
6 In addition, the share of population aged 65+ could cause collinearity bias given the small size of the 
sample (Yamagata 2005). 
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and Honig 2005; Burtless and Quinn 2002; Coile and Gruber 2001). To fill in the 
missing gap, we collected cross-country data on average effective retirement age for the 
period 1998–2008. We obtained the data for effective retirement age from Pensions at a 
ase in age-related expenditure (Bloom et al. 
d Wrede 2010; Boldrin et 
l. 2
penditure as a share of GDP, therefore controlling for the 
e sample. 
 
Glance (OECD 2011a) and Chomik and Whitehouse (2010).  
 Additionally, we attempt to explain the variation in age-related expenditure by the 
shifts in life expectancy. In fact, the increasing life expectancy that high-income 
countries are set to experience in the next decades has been rising faster than effective 
retirement age, reflecting the improvements in medical care. The increase in life 
expectancy, prolonging longevity and reducing mortality risks, accounts for a 
significant share of the anticipated incre
2009). We collected data on life expectancy at birth and at age 65, to account for the 
difference in the response of age-related expenditure on increases in life expectancy at 
various ages. The data were reported by World Development Indicators (World Bank 
2011) and OECD Health Data (OECD 2011) while, for Cyprus and Malta, the data 
were provided by Eurostat. 
 As discussed earlier, the impact of fertility on public pension expenditure is 
unambiguous (Barro and Becker 1989; Wigger 1999; Meier an
a 005). The empirical evidence suggests a negative relationship between age-related 
government spending and equilibrium fertility rates, the former causing a decline in the 
latter. We provide an empirical framework in which cross-country variation in fertility 
rates account for the differences in response of age-related expenditure to changes in 
fertility rates. The data on fertility rates for the period 1998–2008 were provided by U.S. 
Census International Data Base (U.S. Census Bureau 2011). 
 The data on savings-to-GDP ratio were reported by World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2011). While the empirical evidence suggests a strong link between 
savings-to-GDP ratio and public pension expenditure (cf. Coronado 2002; Feldstein and 
Rangueleva 2001; Diamond 2005), we provide the estimates of the effect of savings-to-
GDP ratio on age-related ex
income effect. 
 Finally, we analyzed the impact of net replacement rates on the variation of age-
related spending. Given the difficulty of calculating net replacement rates from income 
distribution, there is no single international statistical source that would report the rates 
and enable a straightforward international comparison of net replacement rates. We 
therefore collected data on average net wages and average net old-age pensions to 
calculate replacement ratios. Table 1 reports statistical sources from which we 
calculated net replacement ratios for each country studied in th
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Table 1. Statistical sources for net replacement rates 
 
Country Statistical source 
Australia Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2007) 
Austria Statistik Österreich (2011) 
elgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, 
ermany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
aly, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
orway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
pain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK 
Pensions at a Glance (OECD 2011a) 
anada Statistics Canada (2004) 
zech Republic Czech Statistical Office (2011) 
reece Hellenic Statistical Authority (2009) 
eland Statistics Iceland (2010); Eurostat (2010) 
pan Japan Statistics Bureau and Statistics Center (2011) 
orea National Pension Service (2009) 
alta Schwarz et al. (2004); Human Development Group 
onal de Estadistica y Geografia (2010) 
and Statistics New Zealand (2010); New Zealand nd (2010) 
tes  
B
G
It
N
S
C
C
G
Ic
Ja
K
M (2010) 
exico Instituto NaciM
New Zeal Superannuation Fu
United Sta Annual Statistical Supplement (U.S. Social SecurityAdministration 2010) 
 
 
5. Methodology and empirical results 
 
For our panel of 33 countries for the period 1998–2008, we estimated fixed-effects and 
s empirical specifications of the model based on expression (32), using as 
ors effective retirement age, savin mographic 
es. To check for the orthogonalit e 
med Hausman’s (1978) specification test for fixed versus random effects. It 
 out that the test statistic was s at 
vel of significance in all test  
 effects estimator is inconsistent an
ed-effects empirical model 2) and 
rther in this section, takes the 
random-effect
regress
l
gs-to-GDP ratio, and a vector of de
variab y of the common effects and regressors w
perfor
turned ufficiently high to reject random effects 
ed specnegligible le
random
ifications. We thus concluded that the
d focused on fixed effects estimates. 
specification, based on expression (3 The fix
estimated fu
 
form: 
2it i itG α ε= + + +1X γ Z γ , (33)  
 
1NT k×∈X \  is a matrix of data for k1 economic where, as given at the end of Section 3, 
explanatory variables, 2NT k×∈Z \  is a matrix of data for k2 demographic explanatory 
variables, and vectors 1 1k ×∈1γ \  and 2 12 k ×∈γ \  are the corresponding vectors of 
parameters. Matrix Z  includes, as column vectors, country-specific interaction dummy 
variables measuring the groupwise impact of net replacement rate on the size of old-age 
expenditure. Additionally, given the fixed-effect specification of the model, the 
disturbances from expression (32) can now be decomposed as it i itv α ε= + , where iα  
captures time-invariant country-specific effects and (0, )it IIDε Σ∼ . 
 As already indicated, four dummy variables were generated denoting country-
specific characteristics based on the asymptotic behaviour of expenditure variances. 
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After having examined variance properties of old-age expenditure, we thus placed each 
country into Anglo-Saxon, Continental Europe 7an, Nordic, or Mediterranean group . 
his is based on crucial institutional cross-country differences in public pension 
hemes; Continental European countries share an a
ension system, public pension systems in Anglo-Saxon countries have been emulated 
nsion schem
liar instit
e regres for each 
ions, toget he
T
sc mbiguous Bismarckian public 
p
on Beveridgian principle, while public pe es in Nordic countries share both 
institutional maxima. Despite a lack of thorough discussion in the literature, Gal (2010) 
also established the pecu utional originality of Mediterranean welfare states. 
 As running separat sions group may disallow the implicit 
comparison of country heterogeneity, we decided to form interaction dummies by 
inserting each country dummy in specified empirical relationship. The robustness of the 
sample coefficients could provide rigorous estimates of the differences in the impact of 
net replacement rates on public pension expenditure. Table 2 provides a detailed 
overview of the variables used in the empirical model specificat her with t  
statistical sources of the data. 
 
Table 2. Statistical sources for net replacement rates 
 
Country Statistical source 
Australia Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2007) 
Austria Statistik Österreich (2011) 
Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK 
Pensions at a Glance (OECD 2011a) 
Canada Statistics Canada (2004) 
Czech Republic Czech Statistical Office (2011) 
Greece Hellenic Statistical Authority (2009) 
Iceland Statistics Iceland (2010); Eurostat (2010) 
Japan Japan Statistics Bureau and Statistics Center (2011) 
Korea National Pension Service (2009) 
Malta Schwarz et al. (2004); Human Development Group (2010) 
Mexico Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (2010) 
ew Zealand Statistics New Zealand (2010); New Zealand n Fund (2010) 
nited States tical Supplement (U.S. Social Security Administration 2010) 
N Superannuatio
Annual StatisU
 
 In Table 3, we provide descriptive  of 
 ex with GDP per capita, 
m in cross-country variation. Given relatively 
ountries s, 
 experienced stable or falling ratio of public 
e, with mild hen extrapolating the 
the future. Although the co ension expenditure 
ective retirement age is moderate ( ant at the 1%, 
                                                
statistics for our panel
erts a strong correlation 
 of data. The share
public pension expenditure in the GDP
although the tendency is not unifor
favourable fertility distribution, c
such as Iceland or Switzerland, have
s-to-GDP over tim
 with stronger fully funded pension system
pension  upward tendency w
estimates into rrelation between public p
and eff –0.476), it is statistically signific
 
7 Although alternative methods of country stratification prove plausible, the difficulty of stratification 
(choosing the relevant criteria) may lead to inconclusive estimates that could underestimate the extent of 
the effects discussed herein. 
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level, suggesting a systematic negative  average, 
ies with lower effective retirement n 
diture or from “benign” prospects o na 
y low retirement age is confined to 
a (1998) to 62.6 years in Estonia 
d during 1998–2008 in 26 out
scriptive statistics 
ari
relationship between the two. On
countr  age suffer either from higher public pensio
expen f future expenditure, whereas the phenome
transition economies, ranging from 56 years in of ver
Sloveni (2006) while, in general, effective retirement 
age increase
 
 of 33 countries in our panel. 
Table 3. De
 
V able Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Public pension expenditure (% of GDP) 8.91 3.60 0.60 14.97 
Old-age dependency ratio 23.46 4.91 9.03 37.00 
Effective retirement age 62.26 3.56 56.00 74.98 
Total fertility rate 1.60 0.31 1.08 2.75 
Life expectancy at birth 78.03 2.54 69.79 82.59 
Life expectancy at age 65 17.89 1.44 14.05 21.10 
Gross savings (% of GDP) 21.77 5.90 5.20 39.44 
Net replacement rate (average net 
pension as % of full-time earnings) 60.8 23.9 13.9 120.9 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 Although declining fertility rates have led to negative real return on PAYG pension 
schemes, there is a wide variation in cross-country fertility rates over time. Excluding 
Mexico as a middle-income country from our sample, fertility rates differ substantially 
 Anglo-Saxon countries from the rates in Continental and Mediterranean Europe, 
gnificantly below replacement rates. In addition, fertility 
tes are significantly negatively correlated with life expectancy at birth, suggesting the 
f demographic transition. On her ha ial cor on betw ife 
rate is erate (0 , though ly signif In 
ent rates on average correlate highly public 
iven a substantial -country ation, w y lower e 
erience lower net r ment ra
ort the results of -effect e  the panel-dat el, 
on (33). Both types of model specification, i.e. with and without 
mated and reported. First, our estimates suggest that the 
ion expenditure (the constant term ere sta ly 
2.7% to 17.5% of GDP. The estimates further suggest that 
exerts a persistent effect on public pensions as a share of 
in
where these have plummeted si
ra
impact o the ot nd, part relati een l
expectancy at age 65 and fertility  mod .225)  high icant. 
addition, net replacem with pension 
expenditure (0.751) g  cross  vari hereb -incom
countries tend to exp eplace te. 
 In Table 4, we rep  fixed stimation of a mod
represented by expressi
interaction dummies are esti
baseline level of public pens , wh tistical
significant) ranges from 1
ld-age dependency ratio o
GDP. The estimated effect suggests that 1 percentage point increase in dependency ratio 
increases the share of public pensions in GDP on average by about 0.11 percentage 
points, holding all other factors constant. Although the literature suggests (cf. 
Seshamani and Gray 2002; Lee and Edwards 2001; Stensnes and Stølen 2007) that 
public pensions should respond strongly to the increases in old-age dependency ratio, 
our estimates suggest that this effect is only moderate after controlling for the other 
determinants of public pension expenditure. 
 Our estimates show that average effective retirement age exerts an important 
influence on public pension expenditure as a share of GDP. The estimated coefficients 
suggest that increases in effective retirement age would facilitate a significant reduction 
in the size of public pensions in GDP, though in specification 1 the estimated effect is 
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considerably lower, compared to specifications 2 and 3. Taking into account the latter 
two specifications, an increase in average effective retirement age by 1 year would 
reduce public pension expenditure as a share of GDP on average, ceteris paribus, by 
some 0.18–0.22 percentage points. 
 
Table 4. Fixed-effects model estimates of public pension expenditure 
 
Explanatory variable Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant term 14.919*** (2.764) 
5.006 
(3.219) 
17.484*** 
(2.774) 
12.749*** 
(2.629) 
Old-age dependency ratio 0.111*** (0.031) 
0.013 
(0.035) 
0.038 
(0.035) 
0.105*** 
(0.029) 
–0.082* Effective retirement age (0.046) (0.050) (0.050) (0.043) 
Total fertility rate –1.552*** (0.340) 
–2.119*** 
(0.342) 
–2.001*** 
(0.350) 
–1.573*** 
(0.320) 
Ratio of gross savings to 
GDP 
–0.101*** 
(0.014) 
–0.086*** 
(0.014) 
–0.090*** 
(0.014) 
–0.088*** 
(0.014) 
Net replacement rate (NRR) 0.019*** (0.004) 
0.027*** 
(0.004) 
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.005) 
Life expectancy at birth – 0.265*** (0.049) – – 
–0.216*** –0.176*** –0.055 
ncy at age 65 – – 0.289*** – 
0.062*** 
(0.015) 
– –0.036*** (0 ) 
ranean 
Observations 
Life expecta (0.072) 
NRR × Anglo-Saxon – – – 
NRR × Nordic – – .009
NRR × Mediter – – – 0.030*** (0.014) 
363 363 363 363 
R2 (within) 0.2610 0.3255 0.2965 0.3508 
R2 (between) 
F–test 
0.6604 0.6880 0.6909 0.1785 
R2 (overall) 0.6378 0.6702 0.6693 0.1827 
22.96 25.67 22.75 21.75 
p–value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman test 
p–value 
74.03 58.26 
0.0000 
295.28 56.04 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
iture age of G ogen le of the  all 
fo rd errors are n paren erisks *, * * denote ance 
t and 1 perce evel, respecti
 
ns. 
 
 to the earlie ttempts to m sure the impact of aging on public 
orporate the equilibrium rtility rate as  covariate y 
2000; Caldwell et al. 2002; Bongaarts 2004), we tried to derive a fram at 
The results suggest that higher fertility rates would 
 reduce the pension DP ratio ( able 4). A rease in fertility rate 
an woul e public n expend  the sha DP 
y 1.55–2.12 perce oints, h ll other constant ugh 
 in fertility rate by such an order of magnitude hly unre the 
Notes: Public pension expend as percen
ven i
t DP is the end ous varia
* d **
b model in
sig ficur specifications. Standa
at the 10 percent, 5 percen
gi
nt l
theses. Ast  an ni
vely. 
Source: Authors’ calculatio
 In comparison r a ea
pensions that do not inc  fe  a  (cf. Disne
ework th
includes this relationship. 
significantly -to-G see T n inc
by one child per wom d reduc  pensio iture in re of G
on average b ntage p olding a factors . Altho
an increase  is hig a  listic,
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estimate suggests that increa total fer tes abso ch of the pressure 
e retirement age e long t ven 
would reduce public pension exp e by as s 1 
ially relevant for economies with a 
partially or fully) funded pension system. The value of regression coefficient suggests 
rease in savings-to-GDP ratio would decrease public pensions 
ses in tility ra rb mu
generated either by aging or lower effectiv over th e
much a
rm. E
half of the referred change enditur
percentage point. 
 Similarly, the increase in savings-to-GDP ratio would reduce public pension 
expenditure in the share of GDP, which is espec
(
that 1 percentage point inc
on average, ceteris paribus, by some 0.09 percentage points. Savings-to-GDP ratio thus 
offsets the increase in the size of public pension expenditure by only a small amount 
compared to the magnitude of the effect of fertility rate. 
 Conversely, increases in longevity and life expectancy at various ages and 
decreases in total fertility rate caused a lasting pressure on public pension expenditure. 
In Bismarckian settings, keeping contribution rates unaltered would require a reduction 
of net replacement rate or an increase in fertility rate that would increase the share of 
working-age population. In Table 4 we tested the impact of life expectancy at birth 
(specification 2) and at age 65 (specification 3) on the size of age-related expenditure. 
Our estimates suggest that increases in life expectancy significantly affect the level of 
expenditure. An increase in life expectancy at birth (specification 2) by additional year 
would raise the level of public expenditure on average by 0.26 percentage points. In 
specification 3, we netted out the impact life expectancy at birth and estimated the effect 
of higher life expectancy at age 65. The estimate then suggests that an increase in life 
expectancy at age 65 by additional year would raise the level of public pension 
expenditure on average by 0.29 percentage points. 
 The estimates concerning net replacement rates suggest that an increase in net 
replacement rate would raise the level of public pension expenditure. In particular, an 
increase by 1 percentage point would, on average, cause the rise of public pension 
expenditure in GDP by some 0.02–0.03 percentage points (specifications 1–3), holding 
demographic covariates, savings-to-GDP ratio and effective retirement age constant. As 
will become clear shortly, the estimates vary due to very different institutional 
frameworks of pension systems that make capturing the effect of net replacement rate 
on public pension expenditure in the panel-data framework less straightforward. 
 Consequently, we also estimated expression (33) by including vectors representing 
interaction dummies into our empirical relationship, as time-invariant dummies in the 
fixed-effects model are dropped and therefore cannot be estimated. We formed 
interaction dummies by multiplying time-invariant dummies and net replacement rate to 
account for the difference in the effect of institutional features of public pension 
systems on the level of public pension expenditure. We set Continental European 
countries with Bismarckian welfare state as the comparison group, to avoid the so-
called “dummy trap” (perfect multicollinearity). 
 As can be seen from specification 4 (Table 4), the estimated interaction dummy 
coefficients suggest that raising net replacement rates would disproportionally increase 
the level of public pension expenditure, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries and 
Mediterranean countries compared to Continental European countries, whereas for 
Nordic countries the estimated coefficient was negative. In particular, this suggests that 
an increase in net replacement rate by 1 percentage point would, on average, increase 
public pension expenditure in GDP by 0.06 percentage points more in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, by 0.03 percentage points more in the Mediterranean countries and by 0.04 
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percentage points less in the Nordic countries, compared to the Continental European 
countries. Differences in the estimated impact of net replacement rate thus, depending 
on institutional characteristics of public pension schemes, arrive at magnitudes of 
different degree. 
 While in Bismarckian PAYG pension schemes, long-term decline in total fertility 
rate would mean either increases in contribution rates or downward adjustment in 
replacement ratios, increasing the level of public pension expenditure in Anglo-Saxon 
countries on the contributory basis would cause a disproportionate pressure on fiscal 
 provided a framework in which life expectancy at various ages is 
creasing due to the excess of positive externalities over negative externalities. We 
ssumed that higher life expectancy leads to the income effect, causing an upward 
t replacement rates over time and increasing the level of age-related 
xpenditure, whereas the baseline cross-country differential in the level of expenditure 
population and diminishing fertility rates shall impose considerable pressure on long-
solvency of social security entitlements, had the level of expenditure increased. 
Increasing the net replacement rate would disproportionately hurt Mediterranean 
countries compared to Continental Europe, given higher old-age dependency ratio and 
negligible fertility rates in Italy and Spain, as well as lower effective retirement age 
causing the incidence of early retirement. In fact, had the incidence of early retirement 
spread across countries with strict eligibility criteria for old-age and social security 
support, the increase in net replacement rate would probably cause greater relative rise 
of public pension expenditure compared to those countries where the incidence of early 
retirement and lax eligibility conditions has been absorbed into higher baseline level of 
old-age expenditure. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Over the last decades, industrialized countries experienced a continuous decline and 
convergence of fertility rates to the level below replacement rate. Lower effective 
retirement age for men and women that substantially deviate from statutory age reflects 
not only changing fertility patterns but, moreover, a persistent increases in life 
expectancy at age 65 and significant spikes in net replacement rates, which took place 
from 1980s onwards. Under the aging population, the Bismarckian PAYG pension 
system, founded on contributory basis, suffered from the setback of unfavourable 
demographic conditions and effective retirement age below the threshold that would 
incur a growing implicit PAYG debt. In particular, lower effective retirement age 
boosted the incidence of early retirement, which raised the present value of fiscal 
obligations to current and prospective generation of pensioners. 
 In this article, we
in
a
pressure on ne
e
captures the baseline differences in life expectancy. Following Becker et al. (1990), we 
assumed that fertility rate is determined endogenously, where increases in human capital 
endowment reduce the equilibrium fertility rate and increase per capita amount of time 
for child raising while, on the other hand, causing a disproportionate rise in old-age 
dependency ratio. Based on these propositions, we constructed an empirical regression 
model capturing the relationship between the level of public pension expenditure and 
key economic and demographic determinants. We then examined robust empirical 
specifications in the panel of 33 countries for the period 1998–2008. 
 Positive (positivist) implications of our empirical findings suggest that aging 
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term sustainability of public pension expenditure, measured as percentage of GDP. The 
economic (and institutional) determinants of public pension expenditure seem to be 
average by 1.8 percentage 
significant, is considerably 
year, keeping all other determinants unchanged. 
much less powerful than crucial demographic determinants, which is not a favourable 
signal for the success of current and future parametric policy measures in the pension 
systems, especially if these are not rigorously implemented. 
 Although increasing life expectancy has been at the forefront of arguments for 
higher effective retirement age, there is a considerable gap in the economic literature in 
documenting the overall impact of higher life expectancy on public pension 
expenditure. We provided a model in which positive externalities account for the 
increasing life expectancy, whereas continuous externalities at later age exert additional 
pressure on net replacement ratio and thus on the overall share of public pension 
expenditure in GDP. Our estimates suggest that higher life expectancy was a significant 
feature behind higher old-age expenditure. In particular, a one-year improvement in life 
expectancy increased the public pension expenditure on average by 0.28 percentage 
points per year, keeping all other determinants unchanged. 
 Declining fertility rates have led on average to negative real return on PAYG 
pension schemes; however, they differed substantially in Anglo-Saxon countries from 
the rates in Continental and Mediterranean Europe, where these have plummeted 
significantly below replacement rates. Fertility rates were significantly negatively 
correlated with life expectancy at birth, suggesting the impact of demographic 
transition. Our empirical estimates suggest that an increase in fertility rate by one child 
per woman would decrease public pension expenditure on 
points, neglecting (first and foremost) the impact of other demographic covariates. 
Although such shifts seem highly unrealistic at present, the estimate suggests the 
potential of a combination of economic and demographic policy measures in fighting 
the effects of aging and unpopular (often ostracized) parametric changes of pension 
systems. 
 Moreover, our estimates suggest that old-age dependency ratio exerted a persistent 
effect on public pensions as a share of GDP. Namely, a one percentage point increase in 
dependency ratio increased the share of public pensions in GDP on average by about 
0.11 percentage points, controlling for the other determinants. We thus found a 
relationship that, even though expected and statistically 
weaker than usually suggested by economic literature. 
 Even though effective retirement age increased in 26 out of 33 countries studied in 
our panel, it is still significantly lower in the long-term perspective as documented by 
Chomik and Whitehouse (2010). Countries with lower effective retirement age either 
suffer from higher public pension expenditure or have poor prospects of future 
expenditure, whereas the phenomena of very low retirement age is confined to transition 
economies. We calculated average effective retirement age for each country as an 
unweighted average of male and female effective retirement age. Although we have not 
provided the long-term impact of lower retirement age (given the lack of reliable data), 
our estimates suggest that raising the effective retirement age by 1 year can reduce the 
burden of public pensions as a share of GDP on average by as much as 0.22 percentage 
point per 
 We also computed the net replacement rate as a ratio of average pensionable 
income and average earnings prior to withdrawal from the labour market and 
established that they correlated highly with public pension expenditure, where lower-
income countries tended to experience lower net replacement rate. Our article provides 
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direct estimates of effects of changing net replacement rates on public pension 
expenditure, which suggest that raising the net replacement rate by 1 percentage point 
arrive at the conclusion that 
r, countries with stronger fully 
croeconomic stability and fiscal solvency of public 
would increase annual public pension expenditure in the share of GDP by some 0.02–
0.03 percentage points, holding everything else constant. 
 As the impact of an increase in net replacement rate depends on institutional 
characteristics of public pension schemes, we ran separate regressions to account for 
cross-country differentials in baseline and average replacement ratios. Our estimates 
suggested that increasing net replacement rates would disproportionally hurt Anglo-
Saxon countries, while the results do not suggest that public pension expenditure in 
these countries are inherently and disproportionally subverted by aging relative to other 
countries. Obviously, one has to keep in mind that pension schemes in these countries 
are mostly based on defined-contribution principle. On the other hand, comparing 
countries with Bismarckian PAYG pension system, we 
Mediterranean countries, facing “benign” fertility rates and rapidly aging population, 
would suffer disproportionately from an increase in net replacement rate, whereas the 
observed effect for Nordic countries relative to Bismarckian welfare states of the 
Continental Europe would be reduced substantially, partly reflecting above-average 
fertility rates that absorb adverse shocks, such as an increase in net replacement rates to 
mitigate the risk of old-age poverty. 
 As a consequence, the share of public pension expenditure in the GDP exerted on 
average a strong correlation with GDP per capita; howeve
funded pension systems have experienced stable or falling ratio of public pensions-to-
GDP over time, with mild upward tendencies. Increasing aggregate savings had a 
favourable effect on public pension expenditure, which is especially relevant for 
economies with a funded pension system. The effects was relatively small, though; a 
one percentage point increase in aggregate savings as a share of GDP would reduce on 
average the share of public pensions in the GDP by 0.09 percentage points per year, 
keeping all other determinants unchanged. 
 The normative implications of our findings are more difficult to ascertain. Since the 
majority of industrial countries live in the world of below-replacement fertility rates and 
persistently aging population, any decreases in effective retirement age and/or increases 
in net replacement rate on a permanent basis would substantially raise the level of 
public pension expenditure, reaching unsustainable levels given that expected increase 
in life expectancy would remain unaltered. Higher spending on old-age entitlements, 
measured as a fraction of GDP, would exert considerable burden on budget deficits and 
public debt, hence compromising ma
pension system, as unfunded pension liabilities already give rise to considerable 
tensions regarding the stability of public finance across high-income countries. 
 Our results indicate that policy measures, aimed at tackling these issues (captured 
herein primarily in the form of economic determinants of public pension expenditure), 
even though separately inferior to all-embracing unfavourable demographic trends, can 
be effective, but have a chance of succeeding only if sufficient and consistently 
implemented in time in the form of pension reforms. 
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